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MULTI-MEMBER ELECTORAL DISTRICTS-DO THEY
VIOLATE THE "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE"
PRINCIPLEt
JOHN F. BANZHAF II1*
One must be ever aware that the Constitution forbids "sophisri-
cated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." ...
However complicated or sophisticated an apportionment scheme
might be, it cannot, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,
result in a significant underevaluation of the weight of the votes
of certain of a State's citizens merely because of where they hap-
pen to reside.1
Multi-member electoral district plans, in which two or more repre-
sentatives are elected at large from a single district, are now in use in
legislative systems in a large majority of the fifty states.2 However,
such systems contain inherent inequalities in representation which
may be of constitutional magnitude and which heretofore have escaped
the attention of scholars, legislators, and the Supreme Court. Now
that Reynolds v. Sims and its companion cases require both houses
of state legislatures to be apportioned substantially on a population
basis, 3 the legislatures and the courts will be reevaluating multi-mem-
+ This article is the result of work performed under a research grant from the Na-
tional Municipal League, New York City, as part of a five-year project, financed with
the help of the Ford Foundation, to improve and strengthen state legislatures. The vicws
and opinions expressed in the article, however, are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the National Municipal League or the Ford Foundation.
* Member of the Bars of New York and the District of Columbia. B.S.E.E. 1962, M.I.T.;
LL.B., 1965, Columbia University.
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 583, 563 (1964) (Warren, C.J.); WVMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo,
377 US. 633, 653 (1964) (Varren, C.J.) (companion cases).
2. Up-to-date figures are difficult to obtain as systems change in efforts to conform
to the reapportionment mandate. As of 1960, all of the state senators from Alaska and
Arizona and some senators in sixteen other states were elected from multi-member dis-
tricts. For the election of members of the lower house, Illinois, Maryland, and Wash-
ington used multi-member districts exclusively, and thirty-five states employed mixed
systems of single and multi-member districts. Silva, Compared Values of the Single. and
the Multi-fember Legislative District, 17 WEsr POL Q. 504, 506 (1964). As of March 1952,
2704 out of 5883 seats in the Nation's lower houses were filled from multi-menlber
districts. These represent over 45% of the seats and they were distributed over three-
fourths of the states. DAVID S EIsENBERG, STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICrxG: MAJOR ISSUES
IN THE WARE OF JUDiciAL DECISION 20 (1962); See Klain, A New Look at the Constituencies:
The Need for a Recount and a Reappraisal, 49 A.t. Pot. Sci. REv. 1105, 1107 (1955).
3. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 1, at 568 (Ala.) ("We hold that, as a basic constitu-
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ber district plans. If, despite their simplistic mathematical appeal and
other possible advantages, such plans fail to provide substantially equal
representation for all constituents, they will have to be abandoned.
The object of this article is to use established techniques of mathe-
matics and political science to analyze multi-member electoral district
systems in terms of representation and voting power within the limits
established by the Supreme Court. It will show that no mixed system
of single and multi-member districts-or system using multi-member
districts of different sizes--can provide substantially equal represen-
tation or voting power for all citizens. This holds true even in cases
of simplified mathematical models which follow the Supreme Court in
ignoring many complicating political realities and treating electoral
systems merely in terms of the voting rules and the relative numbers
of constituents.
This article will briefly examine the "one man, one vote" principle
and present a method of measuring effective voting power with which
different electoral and representative systems can be evaluated. The
measure will be used to analyze systems employing multi-member
districts of unequal size and to demonstrate why such arrangements
necessarily produce inherent inequities in the voting power and rep-
resentation of citizen-voters. It will also indicate how this method of
analysis may be used in addition to measure the impact of other factors
which are also relevant to voting power and effective representation.
Finally, the article will explain why several recent Supreme Court
decisions have not foreclosed the issue of the constitutionality of
multi-member district systems. The multi-member district systems of
Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Texas, and Wyoming will be used as
examples to demonstrate the extent to which actual systems may dis-
advantage portions of the electorate.
I. THE METHOD, ITS BASIS AND ITS OBJECTIVE
So far the Supreme Court has effectively limited its consideration of
the inequalities of voting power and effective representation in appor-
tionment plans to the relative number of constituents in each electoral
district. The Court appears to have given little weight to the strength
or cohesiveness of the political parties, the presence and distribution
of major ethnic blocs, the power structure within the legislative body
tional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of
a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis"); WMCA v.
Lomenzo, supra note 1 (N.Y.); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377
U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Va.); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695
(1964) (Del.); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colo.).
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(committees and their chairmen, etc.) and other factors which obvi-
ously would affect the ability of a citizen-voter to pick a representative
of his choice and to have some influence on which bills pass.4 The
analysis presented here deliberately goes no further. It also considers
all voters to be equal in a statistical sense and does no more than study
in a more precise way the effects of their distribution among different
electoral districts.
This analysis does not pretend to be a complete picture of the repre-
sentative system and the conclusions do not necessarily reflect all politi-
cal realities. Rather it is an attempt to measure more accurately in the
Supreme Court's own terms the theoretical effects of multi-member
districts. If the Court's consideration of such issues continues on this
limited level of abstraction, the analysis and its conclusions should
serve as a basis for decision. If, on the other hand, the Court decides
to take other factors into account, the simple mathematical models
presented here may be modified to include the additional assump-
tions, and similar methods of analysis may be used to present a better
picture of legislative realities and to aid the courts in their decisions.
For all of their talk about "one man, one vote," the Justices of the
Supreme Court have not stated with sufficient precision the decisive
factor which must be "substantially equal" or the way in which it is
to be measured and compared. Instead, they have approved one method
-that of substantially equally populous districts electing legislators
casting one vote-and have refused to invalidate others without proof
of inequalities. (See VI infra.) One may construe the reapportionment
decisions strictly, limiting their holdings to particular circumstances,
and conclude that only the relative ability of citizen-voters to vote for
their legislators need be equalized. On the other hand the opinions
may be read more broadly, giving effect to their underlying purpose
4. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965);
cases cited note 3 supra; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court has indicated, however,
that some weight may be given to other legitimate legislative considerations in consider-
ing whether the deviations from the equal population standard are constitutionally
permissible. See, eg., Reynolds v. Sims, supra note I at 578-81.
5. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, supra note 4, at 188 (complaint alleges "debasement of ...
votes"); id. at 208 ("a citizen's right to vote free of arbitrary impairment'); id. at 2-12 ("the
question is the extent to which a State may weigh one person's vote more heavily than it
does another's." (Douglas, J. concurring)). The debasement of the votes of citizens in the
populous counties, the Court said, was similar to the "dilution [caused] by a false tally,
.. a refusal to count votes from arbitrarily selected precincts, ... and a stuffing of the
ballot box." Id. at 208. (Citations omitted.) In Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 1, at 566, the
Court clearly stated "we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the oppor-
tunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators."
1966] 1311
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:1809
and many expressions of dicta,6 to hold that only systems which pro-
vide substantially equally effective representation-at least in theory-
are constitutional.7
The method of analysis proposed in this article does not depend
upon one particular interpretation of the reapportionment decisions.
On the contrary, it is possible to develop and analyze a mathematical
model based upon either criteria. Because the two principles are so
closely related, the two models are complementary and not antag-
onistic; both lead to the conclusion that inequities are inherent in the
multi-member districting.
One might wonder, however, whether the two concepts are not only
complementary, but also equivalent. Doesn't equality in voting power
among citizen-voters automatically produce equal representation? The
answer, as will be shown, is that it will do so only if the elected repre-
sentatives are theoretically equal; i.e., are elected in the same fashion
and have the same voting power in the legislature. Conversely, if the
elected representatives are not mathematically identical, then there
can be serious inequalities in representation even if each district con-
6. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 1, at 568 ("the Equal Protection Clause de-
mands no less than substantially equal state representation for all citizens. . . .'); WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, supra note 1, at 636 ("as a result [of the misapportionment], the
Plaintiff's votes are not as effective in either house of the legislature as the votes of other
citizens .... ); id. at 654 ("[because of a] built-in bias against voters living in the states'
more populous counties. . . the legislative representation accorded to the urban and sub.
urban area becomes proportionately less as the population of those areas increases.");
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, supra note 3, at 673 ("the proper, and
indeed indispensable, subject for judicial focus in a legislative apportionment contro-
versy is the overall representation accorded to the state's voters, in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature.').
7. Professor Robert G. Dixon, George Washington Law School, puts it in these words:
These are not right-to-vote cases, even though voting is involved, They are repre-
sentation cases; i.e., they are cases concerning the most interesting, the most complex,
the most baffling aspect of any democratic political system, namely, the ascertain-
ment of public feeling on innumerable public policy issues through the medium of
periodic, partisan selection of district delegates to a multimembered representative
assembly.
Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives: What is Fair Representation, 51 A.B.A.J. 319
(1965), reprinted in 111 CONG. REc., 10601 (daily ed. May 19, 1965).
The effective difference between these two approaches was well stated by Miller and
Stokes:
Broadly speaking, the constituency can control the policy actions of the Representa-
tive in two alternative ways. The first of these is to choose a Representative who so
shares its views that in following his own convictions he does his constituents'
will.... The second means of constituency control is for the Congressman to follow
his (at least tolerably accurate) perceptions of district attitude in order to win re-
election.
Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 Am. POL. Scr. Rxv. 45, 50-51 (1963).
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tains equal numbers of citizen-voters." Equal voting power is not syn-
onymous with equal representation.
In the most common legislative situation all representatives are
equal, at least in terms of a simplified mathematical model. Each repre-
sents a single district and has the same number of votes as every
other representative.9 Given these two conditions, a necessary and
sufficient condition for equal representation is that each district con-
tain substantially the same number of people. In effect, this has been
the holding of recent reapportionment cases which have been confined
to situations involving mathematically identical representatives. But
equality in district population alone does not insure equal representa-
tion if the representatives themselves are in some way unequal (that
is, if the conditions assumed above are changed). As a simple example,
consider a state divided into twenty-one districts of substantially equal
population. The citizens would not be equally represented if the legis-
lators from the ten even-numbered districts could each cast two votes
while those from the remaining eleven destricts could cast only one
vote. Likewise, the residents of the odd-numbered districts would be
underrepresented, despite the equality in district population, if each
even-numbered district elected two representatives at large while the
other districts each elected only one representative. A less obvious
example is if representatives from the ten even-numbered districts auto-
matically become members of a committee which has absolute power
over which bills are put to a vote.
Equal representation, then, demands more than mere equality of
voting power at the citizen-voter level (i.e., substantially equally popu-
8. There is some uncertainty concerning the numbers which are to be used in calculat-
ing the people of a district who are entitled to equal representation. It is not certain
whether the measure should be based on the number of inhabitants, residents, voters,
etc. Cf. Davis v. Mann, supra note 3; Bums v. Richardson, supra note 4, at 90-97. For
simplicity, this article will use the words "citizen-voters," "voters," "population," "people
represented," etc. interchangeably to indicate that class of people who should be counted
in determining effective representation, without considering the relative merits of using
any particular class as a measure. Where the words "larger" or "smaller" are used with
respect to districts, the reference is to population and not to geographic size.
9. Naturally, no two legislators are ever exact equivalents. Some will be more effective
because seniority will have given them powerful committee positions. Others may be
more persuasive speakers, have more or better political connections, or be in closer
touch with constituents. However, for the sake of constructing a mathematical model to
determine the minimum requirements for equality of representation, they may be said to
be equal or mathematically equivalent if they are elected in identical manners and
have the same voting power. In other words, they are theoretically equal if they are
distinguished only by what are normally regarded as personal characteristics and not
because of inequalities in the electoral or representative system.
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lous districts). If the electoral districts have substantially equal popula-
tions, equal representation also requires that all districts elect the same
number of representatives who are equal in the legislature. Conversely,
if the elected representatives are mathematically equivalent, then rep-
resentation will be equal if and only if the districts are of substantially
equal population. This much has been clear without mathematical
analysis. Serious questions arise, however, when the districts are of
substantially unequal populations and the legislators are also unequal
in their voting power, method of election, or both. Two examples of
this are weighted voting' and multi-member districts. To resolve
such questions, it is necessary to devise a test of voting power or effec-
tive representation (depending on which interpretation is accepted)
which will include both factors-the ability of the citizen-voter to
elect or affect his representatives and the ability of representatives to
affect the outcome of legislative decisions through voting--in a single
all-inclusive measure.
II. THE MEASURE OF VOTING POWER
A measure of voting power may most easily be developed by consider-
ing a system of direct representation such as voting in a private club
or stockholders' meeting. If all of the members of a given body can
cast only one vote, if no member has a veto, and if there are no other
procedural devices whereby one member has a built-in advantage, then
all members obviously have equal voting power. However, if the mem-
bers do not all cast an equal number of votes, or if one or more have
some type of veto, or if a small committee of only a few members has
absolute control over what measures may be voted upon, the voting
power of the members cannot be equal. Here the solution is not obvi-
ous and a clearly defined measure is necessary.
The ability to cast a vote does not always carry with it voting power
in a meaningful sense. Moreover, the number of votes each participant
may cast is not always an accurate indication of voting strength. For
example, if in a three-man body A has 3 votes, B has 1 vote, and C
has 1 vote, B and C have no effective voting power because they can-
not affect the outcome in any way. A has an absolute majority and can
pass or defeat any measure regardless of the wishes of B and C. The
ratio of voting power of A to B is not 3 to 1, as might be expected
from a simple comparison of the numbers of votes, but rather 3
10. For an application of the ideas in this article to weighted voting situations, see
Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 Rutvoas L. REv.
317 (1965); notes 19-22, 33 infra and note 44 and accompanying text infra.
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to 0. A has all of the voting power and B and C have no voting
power at all.
Consider a second situation in which A, B, and C each have I vote.
They have equal voting power because a combination of any two of
the three can pass or defeat any proposal and it makes no difference
which two of the three join together. Now suppose that A and B each
may cast 100 votes while C still casts only I vote. At first it might
seem that A and B each have a greater voting power than C. Yet this
is untrue. No change has been made in the relative ability of A, B, or
C to affect the outcomes. Any two of the three may still pass or defeat
any proposal. The majority of A plus B, with 200 votes, is no more
powerful than the majority of A plus C, with only 101 votes, because
each constitutes a majority with the power to pass or defeat proposals.
No proposal which would have passed before will fail to pass under
the new system; a bill defeated under the old system will have the
same fate under the new. Since the results in all cases and under all
circumstances are the same, effective voting power has not changed.
The change in the distribution of votes has had no effect on the effec-
tive voting power.
The purpose of any voting system is to allow each participant some
chance, however small, to affect the decisions of the group. Where all
have an equal vote, each has an equal chance to affect the outcome.
Power in a voting body, in the abstract mathematical sense, is the
ability to affect outcomes by participating in the voting process. It is
reasonable, therefore, to base a measure of voting power on the rela-
tive ability of each member to affect the outcome of the group's deci-
sions through his vote. For any particular body there are a definite
number of different possible voting combinations-a number which
represents all of the possible ways the members can vote. In many of
these combinations an individual may not be able to affect the group's
decision by changing his vote. In some the vote is close enough that a
change in an individual member's vote will alter the outcome. His
relative ability to do this serves as an index of his voting power. By
examining all voting members in all possible voting combinations, it
is possible to derive a measure of overall voting effectiveness.
There are a number of reasons why a member may not be able to
affect the outcome with his vote in a particular voting combination.
In the first place, he may have no voting power in any voting com-
bination, as in the case of B and C above who have one vote each
while A has three. No change in the vote of B or C could ever change
the outcome. Secondly, if some members have relatively large amounts
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of voting power, a less powerful member may have a chance to affect
the outcome only when all of the larger powers are deadlocked. Finally,
even in a relatively evenly balanced body, any individual member can
affect the outcome only if the difference between the minority and
majority votes is small.
A measure of a member's overall effectiveness (i.e., voting power)
may be obtained by examining all of the situations in which he can
affect the outcome. After all, voting power can only be measured by
its effects or potential effects, and the one significant effect of a mem-
ber's voting power is to affect group decisions." Because a priori all
voting combinations are equally possible, any objective measure of
voting power must treat them as equally significant. To put the same
thought another way, in drafting or evaluating a particular system,
no one can say beforehand which combinations will occur most often,
or which will occur with respect to more important issues. The best a
constitutional draftsman or judge seeking equal voting power can
do is to satisfy himself that the system allows each voting member an
opportunity to affect the outcome in an equal number of equally
likely voting combinations.
A fair, reasonable, and objective measure of voting power may be
obtained as follows. Construct a table of all possible voting combina-
tions for a given body. Determine in which combinations each voting
member can alter the outcome by changing his vote. The total for
each member is a relative measure of his voting power. More explicitly,
in a case in which there are N voters, each acting independently and
each capable of influencing the outcome only by means of his votes, the
ratio of the voting power of voter X to the voting power of voter Y
is the same as the ratio of the number of possible voting combinations
of the entire voting body in which X can alter the outcome by chang-
ing his vote to the number of combinations in which Y can alter the
outcome by changing his vote.
This measure meets certain basic requirements. It is based on com-
monly accepted notions of the purpose and mechanics of voting situa-
tions; it is completely objective and depends only on factors which can
11. As previously indicated, a legislator in practice may have political power far In
excess of that which comes solely from his right to vote. Moreover, he may exercise
power in many ways other than by voting; e.g., where he influences political appoint-
ments. Yet, the purpose of this study is not to produce an all-conclusive estimate of a
legislator's power but rather to see if the legislative system itself gives him or his con-
stituents an unfair advantage. To achieve this purpose, a possible approach, and the
one which so far has been followed by the courts, is to ignore individual differences
between persons casting votes.
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be readily and accurately determined; and it can be used to make mean-
ingful calculations in actual voting situations,'2 as well as the two
simple examples which have been discussed.13 Finally, it is substan-
tially in accord with a measure of voting power which has been gen-
erally accepted in the fields of mathematics 4 and political science
and which has been used by others to analyze voting power in the
Electoral College,16 Congress and stockholders meetings,'7 the French
12. The measure is based upon commonly accepted notions of the purpose of voting
systems because it focuses on the ability of the individual voter to affect the outcome of
decisions. It makes no unreasonable assumptions about the legislative process because
it assumes only that a priori no particular voting combination is more important or sig-
nificant than any other. It is completely objective because it depends only on the rules
governing the voting situation (number of votes per legislator, veto power, etc.) and
not on past performances or individual characteristics of legislators. Finally, it yields a
measure from which meaningful calculations can and have been made in actual voting
situations. See notes 16-22 infra.
13. In a three-man body where A has 3 votes and B and C each have I vote, there are
8 possible voting combinations. In all 8 a change in the vote of A will change the deci-
sion of the body. In no combination will B or C be able to alter the outcome by chang-
ing a vote. This demonstrates, as was already obvious, that A has all the power and B
and C have none.
In a three-man body where A and B each have 100 votes and C has 1, there are also
8 possible voting combinations. A can change the outcome in 4 of these, B can change
the outcome in 4 combinations, and C can change the outcome in 4 combinations. This
demonstrates, as was previously shown, that A, B and C are equally powerful. For addi-
tional examples and discussions, see Banzhaf, supra note 10.
14. See, e.g., KrmzNy, SqEr.L & THo.msoN, INTEODUCnio, To FuNrrE MATEATics 74,
108 (1957); Shapley, Solutions of Compound Games, in ADvANcEs IN G.ts THEoRY 267
(Dresher, Shapley & Tucker ed. 1964); Riker, A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index,
4 BEHAVIORAL Sct Nc 120-31 (1959); Shapley, Simple Games: An Outline of the Descrip-
tive Theory, 7 BE.AwoAL SCIENCE 59 (1962); Shapley, A 'alue for N-Person Games, 2
ANNALs OF MATHEmA CAL SrTUDms 307 (No. 28, 1953).
15. See, e.g., DAvm, GOLnmAN & BArn, THE PoLrrzcs OF NATI.NAL PAR"T CO.NvN:O;s
174-75 (1960); ScHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, d. 4 (1959);
ScHUBERT, JUDCItAL BEHAVIOR (1964); Krislov, Theoretical Attempts at Predicting Judicial
Behavior, 79 HALv. L. R-v. 1573 (1966); Krislov, Power and Coalition in a Nine-Man Body,
Am. BEHAVIORAL Sc. (Apr. 1963); Riker, Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power, 58
Ams. POL. SCe. REv. 341 (1964); Riker, Bargaining in a Three-Person Game, a paper deliv-
ered at 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association SepL 6-10,
1966; Schubert, The Power of Organized Minorities in a Small Group, 9 AD. Scntc Q.
133 (1964); Shapley 8: Shubik, A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a
Committee System, 48 Ams. PoL Sci. REv. 787 (1954); and notes 16-22 infra.
16. Mann & Shapley, The A Priori Voting Strength of the Electoral College, in GAM.E
THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SocIAL BEHAVIOR (Shubik ed. 1964); %AN*,. & SnAp-
LEY, VALUES OF LARGE GAmis IV: EVALUATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGcE BY MoNTE CAN.O
TECHNIQUES (RAND Corp. Memo RM-2651, Sept. 19, 1960); LANN & SHAPLEY, VALUES OF
LARGE GArMs VI: EvALUATING THE ELEcroRAL COLLEE FxACLY (RAND Corp. Memo R.NM-
3158-PR, May 1962).
17. Riker & Niemi, The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Repre-
sentatives, 56 Am. Por-. Sc. REV. 58-65 (1962); Shapley & Shubik, supra note 15.
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Assembly,18 New York City's Board of Estimate, 19 and weighted vot-
ing situations in general.20 The measure presented here has previously
been used to analyze weighted voting in the New Jersey Senate, Nassau
County, N.Y., 21 and Herkimer County, N.Y., where it formed the basis
for a decision against weighted voting.22
In most of the studies mentioned above, the measure has been used
to analyze voting power in systems of direct representation or by treat-
ing systems of indirect representation in terms of the voting power of
elected representatives. This is quite reasonable; although a legislator
may serve as a spokesman, a lobbyist, and an ombudsman, he is first
and foremost a voting member of a deliberative voting body. However,
to study the distribution of voting power in multi-member district
systems in terms of the "one man, one vote" principle, it is necessary
to apply the measure to the individual citizen-voter. 23
18. Riker, supra note 14, at 120-21.
19. Krislov, The Power Index, Reapportionment and the Principle of One Man, One
Vote, 1965 M.U.L.L. 37.
20. Ibid.; Riker & Shapley, Weighted Voting: A Mathematical Analysis for Instru-
mental Judgments, presented at the Christmas 1965 meeting of the American Society for
Political and Legal Philosophy, in New York City, and will appear in the 1966 volume
of NoMos, the Society yearbook, also reprinted by RAND Corp. in P-3318 (1966).
21. Banzhaf, supra note 10. The study demonstrated that the Nassau County system of
weighted voting, widely cited in support of weighted voting systems, was unconstitutional
because 3 of the 6 members of the Board of Supervisors could not affect the decisions
of the Board with their votes. Plans are now under way to change the system. See
NASSAU COUNTY COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL REVIsiON, MAJORITY REPORT ON ATIcLE I
(June 28, 1965); CONCURRING REPORT OF BoAmw OF Sus'ERvisoPs (June 30, 1965); N.Y. Times,
July 8, 1965, p. 63, col. 1.
The measure of voting power used by the author is substantially the same as the other
mentioned above. Both define voting power in terms of the ability of the voter to affect
the decisions of the group. Both measure it by counting the number of voting arrange-
ments in which a voter can cast a decisive or critical vote. The difference is that the
Shapley-Shubik index of power is based on the number of permutations, rather titan
combinations, in which each legislator can cast a decisive vote. According to Riker and
Shapley, however, there are no significant qualitative differences between the two meas.
ures and the results of the analysis presented herein are the same with either definition.
See Riker & Shapley, supra note 20.
22. Morris v. Board of Supervisors of Herkimer County, 50 Misc. 2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1966)
(Cardamone, J.), in which the author was called upon to make a mathematical analysis
of a proposed reapportionment plan. In finding the plan unacceptable, the court cited
the results of the study and the author's earlier article; this article was also presented
to the court in draft form. See also Davis v. Board of Supervisors of the County of
Clinton, Supreme Court of New York, Clinton County, August 22, 1966 (Soden, J.);
Graham v. Board of Supervisors, Supreme Court of New York, County of Erie, June 28,
1966 (Kelly, J.); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 246 F. Supp. 953, 959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Levet,
J. dissenting); Barzelay & Carocci v. Board of Supervisors, Supreme Court of New York,
Onondaga County.
23. The rights protected by the Constitution are those of the citizen-voter and not
[Vol. 75: 130D
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III. VOTING POWER AND MULTI-MEMBER DiTRncTs
It is possible to analyze legislative systems in terms of voting power
by applying the measure just developed to determine if each citizen-
voter has a substantially equal chance to affect the election of his rep-
resentative. If all of the districts in a state have, for example, 10,000
voters, it is easy to see without any calculation that all voters have
the same voting power in the Supreme Court's terms. In the abstract
model a citizen of district A will have the same chance, however small,
to affect the election of a legislator from A as the citizen of B will have
to affect the election of the representative from B. Moreover, one can
see, again without calculations, that if A becomes more populous than B,
the chance of any citizen of A to affect the election of his representa-
tive decreases. Hence, in terms of the definition, and in accordance
wvith the reapportionment decisions, one concludes that his voting
power (or weight or strength) has decreased. As long as there are only
single-member districts, it is evident that all citizens will have an equal
ability to affect the election of their legislators only if the population
of the districts is the same.
But suppose the population of A grows to 30,000 while B and the
other districts still have approximately 10,000 voters. Instead of divid-
ing district A into three smaller ones, it is decided to allow district
A to elect 3 representatives at large who will each have the same vote
as the legislators from the smaller districts. Do all voters still have
equal voting power? Proponents of such systems seem to regard the
equality of voting power as self-evident. They would reason that a
voter's chance of affecting an election decreases when the district grows
from 10,000 to 30,000 but that the opportunity to vote for three can-
didates restores him to parity with a voter in a district of 10,000.24 Un-
those of the legislator. The legislator's voting power is significant only insofar as it affects
his constituents. Therefore, the contitutional issues can only be resolved by extending the
analysis to the voter himself.
24. Compare, for example, the explanation presented by the defendants in Fortson v.
Dorsey to justify the Georgia multi-member district system:
The challenged method of electing senators in this case does not produce any math-
ematical devaluation of the vote. For example, let us compare the status of a Fulton
County voter with one who resides in a rural district electing a single senator. The
Fulton voter is a part of an electorate which is approximately seven times larger than
the electorate of which the rural voter is a part, however, the Fulton County voter
has the right to vote for seven senators whereas the rural voter may only vote for
one. Theoretically, the rural voter would have a greater influence upon his single
senator than the Fulton voter would have upon any one of his seven senators, but
the latter's aggregate influence upon each of his senators would equal the rural
voter's influence upon his single senator. In other words, the Fulton voter has an
advantage in being able to vote for seven senators, but this advantage is offset by
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fortunately, there is a serious flaw in this theoretical justification of
the system, for voting power does not vary-even in theory-as the
inverse of (1 divided by) the district population.
A few simplified examples will demonstrate that the ability of the
individual citizen-voter to affect the election of his representative(s)
does not vary inversely with population. Consider the four small






In each case it is assumed that the principal contest is between two
major candidates and that each voter can cast one vote for each legis-
lative position in his district.25 With three voters in a district and only
two possible choices, there are eight possible voting combinations and
each voter can change the outcome of the election by changing his vote
in four of them. Thus in District H each resident casts a critical or
his being a part of the large electorate necessary to support the representation of
seven senators.
Brief for the Appellant, p. 18, Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Jurisdictional State.
ment, pp. 12-13. Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 11-12, Id.
25. In the vast majority of elections in multi-member districts, the contest is between
only two major political parties. Silva, Relation of Representation and the Party System
to the Number of Seats Apportioned to a Legislative District, 17 WVEST. POL. Q. 742,
742-45 (1964); Silva, supra note 2. Votes for third parties or splinter candidates are usually
only a small percentage of the total cast. Moreover, it is probably true that people
casting these votes do so as a sign of protest or strength rather than as a genuine attempt
to affect the election of the "candidate." In what appears to be the general rule, each
major party nominates as many candidates as there are legislators to be chosen from
a given district.
In some states, candidates are by law or by custom nominated for particular legislative
positions within a given multi-member district. See, e.g., O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp.
708, 713-14 (D.S.C. 1966); Ga. Laws, Sept.-Oct. 1962, Extra Sess., pp. 7-31, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 47-102 (9) (Cum. Supp. 1963). For example, if a district elects three representatives, each
major party will support one candidate for seat one, one for seat two, and one for seat
three. The voter thus has only an either-or choice with respect to each position. The effec-
tive results are probably the same even where the candidates run at large from the district.
The analysis would be different under various hybrid voting systems such as cumulative
voting, proportional representation, or limited voting. However, elections for 98 out of
99 state legislative bodies, including both single and multi-member district states, use the
familiar single-ballot plurality vote system. Silva, Relation of Representation and the Party
System to the Number of Seats Apportioned to a Legislative District, 17 WEST. POL. Q.
742 (1964).
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determinative vote 50% of the time. In District I with five voters,
there are thirty-two possible voting combinations and each voter can
cast a critical vote in twelve of them. Thus a voter in District I can cast
a critical vote 37.5% of the time. With seven votes, there are 128 voting
combinations and each voter casts a critical vote in forty of these. The
percentage is thus 31% for District J. For District K, the correspond-
ing figures are 512 voting combinations, 140 in which any individual
voter can cast a critical vote, and a percentage of about 28%. -0 The
26. Let the three voters in district H be A, B, and C. A may vote in 2 ways. In
each of these 2 cases, B could also vote 2 ways. Finally, in each of these 4 cases, C
could vote in either of two ways. In general, a body of N persons voting yea or nay
has 2N different possible voting combinations.
The table below shows the 8 voting combinations possible in the district. It also shows
in which combinations each voter casts a critical vote. It should be noted that often more
than one voter may cast a critical vote in the same combination in the sense that a
change by either would affect the outcome. Thus in combination 2 a change in the vote
of either A or B would change the outcome of the district's majority vote from pass (P)
to fail (F).
Possible Voting Measure Passes Voter Casts a
Combinations or Fails Critical Vote
A B C A B C
1 Y Y Y P
2 Y Y N P X X
3 Y N Y P X X
4 Y N N F X X
5 N Y Y P X X
6 N Y N F X X
7 N N Y F X X
8 N N N F
Y=Yea P =Pass X means that the par-
N = Nay F = Fail ticular legislator can
change the outcome in
that combination.
In a district of N voters, there are 2N different voting combinations. For an in-
dividual voter to be able to cast a critical vote, the other voters in the district must be
equally divided. The formula for the number of combinations which can be formed
by M persons divided into two equal groups is
Ml
The exclamation point (1) indicates a factorial. It means that the number it follows is
to be multiplied by every positive integer smaller than itself (e.g., 41 = 4 - 3 - 2• 1 = 24).
In calculating the number of times each person can cast a critical vote, the fraction must
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following chart compares these figures of actual voting effectiveness with
those which would result if the ability of each voter to affect his legisla-
tor's election actually varied inversely with population (as proponents
of multi-member districts suggest).
Number of Combinations (in %) in
Which Voter Can Affect Outcome
Calculated From
Inverse Ratio
District Population Actual Hypothesis
H 3 50.0% 33.3%
I 5 37.5% 20.0%
J 7 31.1% 14.3%
K 9 27A% 11.1%
This table shows that voting effectiveness actually decreases more slowly
with increasing population than the inverse ratio hypothesis would
suggest.
Of course, the population figures in these four examples are un-
realistically low. They were chosen merely to illustrate the effect which
is described above and to demonstrate the fallacy of the inverse ratio
hypothesis which is used to justify multi-member electoral systems with
different sized districts. In real electoral systems the populations of
each district will be in the thousands or tens of thousands. With num-
bers this large actual numerical calculations are difficult if not impos-
sible.2 However, as the number of voters becomes larger, the per-
centage of times in which each citizen-voter can affect the outcome of
be multiplied by 2 to account for both the yea and nay votes. Calculations for the four
examples are presented below.
Number of Times
Possible Each Casts Percent
District Population Combinations Critical Vote Influence
21
H 3 23 = 8 2 X _ 4 4/8 = 50%(1!) (11)
41
12 = 52 2 X = 12 12/32= 3-7.5%(21) . (2!)
61
7 27=128 2X 1 =40 40/128 = 31%(3). (31)
8!
K 9 29 = 512 2 X 81 =140 140/512 = 28%(4). (4!)
27. For example, in a district of only 101 citizens, there are 2,535,301,200,456,458,802,
993,406,410,752 different possible voting combinations. The factorial of fifty (501), one
of the other numbers which would enter into the calculations, is approximately equal to
three followed by sixty-four zeros. These numbers are too large even for large electronic
computers to wor with,
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the election can be approximated with a great deal of accuracy. The
use of a standard mathematical technique of approximation demon-
strates that the voter's ability to affect the election of his legislator
decreases as the inverse of the square root of the population of the
district 28 rather than as the simple inverse of the population.
In electoral systems employing different sized multi-member districts,
residents of the larger districts thus have more voting power than those
of less populous districts. Although the individual voter's ability to
influence the election of his representative decreases as the square
root of the population, each district is entitled under the system to a
number of representatives proportional to the population. Thus, as
the districts get more populous, they are given more representatives
28. Consider a district made up of N + 1 citizen-voters, where N is an even number.
The total number of ways in which each citizen-voter could vote )ca or nay on a par-
ticular issue is 2N + 1 which is equal to 2 - 2N. Each would be able to cast a critical vote
N
only where the other N citizen-voters were equally divided into two groups; - voting
N 2-Ni
yea and-voting nay. This, as previously indicated, can happen in
ways. Thus, an individual citizen-voter would be critical in determining the outcome of
a vote in the following fraction of combinations.
2-NI NI
The factorial of large numbers may be very ciosely approximated by the following
formula which is known as Stirling's formula:
ml = e-m.mm-VZ rM
where e and r are well known mathematical constants. Substituting this value into the
N
previous formula by allowing - to equal m, the fraction becomes:
e-2m. (2m)-m • --
22m - e-m - mm - /2tcm- e-- - mm - -V2,m
By expanding the numerator into separate multiplicative terms and cancelling common
terms in the numerator and denominator, the result is that the individual citizen-voter
1
is critical in - combinations.
-V2zN
Where m is greater than 100, Stirling's formula gives a result which is accurate to
within 0.1%o and becomes more accurate as m increases. SOKOLNr oFF & REDHFFE3R,
MAJATHEMATICS OF PHYSICS AND MODERN ENGINEERING 64445 (1958).
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than are necessary to compensate for the decrease in the individual
citizen-voter's voting effectiveness. As an example, if one district is four
times the population of another, it will have four times the number of
representatives although each citizen-voter has half (one divided by the
square root of four) the voting power (per representative) of the citizen-
voters in the smaller district. Thus residents of the larger district will be
overcompensated in voting power with respect to the residents of the
smaller district by 100%. If the original ratio of district populations is
nine to one, the overrepresentation is by a factor of 200o.
It should be noted that these inequalities in voting power are an
inherent problem even in a theoretical model in which districts are
exact multiples of each other in population and all considerations other
than relative populations are ignored. In actual situations where popu-
lations only approximate this "ideal," the inequalities will tend to be
magnified. If other realities of political life which may affect actual
voting power-such as political parties, pressure groups, ethnic blocs,
campaign strategies, voter apathy, etc.-are considered in addition,
their influence will be superimposed upon the inequalities revealed in
the simplified model. It is highly unlikely that one or more of these
would exactly counterbalance the effect which has been demonstrated.
IV. REPRESENTATION AND MULTI-MEMBER DIsTIuars
The broader interpretation of the reapportionment decisions is that
equality in the power to vote and thereby to affect the election of
legislators is only a means to an end, a part of a larger and more com-
plicated problem. The problem is how to afford each voter equal rep-
resentation under a system in which one or more legislators act for
him in a legislative body. So far the courts have held that one way this
can be accomplished is by dividing the state into districts of substan-
tially equal population, allowing each district to select one legislator,
and allowing each legislator one vote in the chamber. It is an open
question whether voters can be equally represented where districts of
different populations elect different numbers of legislators to the same
body.
To answer the question it is necessary to consider the role and func-
tion of the legislator. Here one may broadly distinguish between two
contrasting hypotheses. One, which is often called the Burkean (or
republican) model, assumes a legislator who acts for the whole area
being governed without consideration for the particular interests of
his constituents. He decides issues according to what he feels is best
for the whole state, based either upon his assessment of their majority
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wishes or his own best judgment. In contrast there is the delegate
(or democratic or representative) model, which assumes that a legislator
acts as the delegate of his constituents. On each issue he is presumed
to act according to what he believes to be the will of the majority in
his district.2 9 In effect the votes of all of the citizens are "funneled"
into the legislature through their representative.
Certainly both theories are gross simplifications and are subject to
criticism for this and other reasons. Evidence suggests that neither
model is entirely satisfactory in general but that in many respects the
representative theory provides a reasonable approximation to legis-
lative situations.30 Furthermore, in terms of effective representation,
only the delegate model need be considered. To the extent that legis-
lators act according to the Burkean model, it is of little relevance what
size districts they represent. Each acts for all of the people and does not
attempt to reflect the particular wishes of his constituents. If one legis-
lator has more or less than the average number of constituents, how
is anyone advantaged or harmed? To this extent the purpose of the
elective system would appear to be simply to select the requisite num-
ber of wise and able men to act together to make judgments for the
people of the state. There is no evidence to show that the ability to
select such men depends closely on population or that a basic consti-
tutional right is involved.31
29. See Riker & Shapley, supra note 20, at 23-31. See generally SAn N.E, HIsroR- OF
PoLtcAL PHLOSOPHY 610 (1950); ,VAHLrXE, EULAU, BUCHANAN & FERGUSON, THE LcIstaA-mt
SYsmr 273 ff. (1962).
30. See, e.g., Cnuddle & McCrone, The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and
Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model, 60 Amr. Po SCt. REv. 66, 69-70 (1966):
This analysis indicates that constituencies do not influence civil rights roll calls in
the House of Representatives by selecting Congressmen whose attitudes mirror their
own. Instead, Congressmen vote their constituencies' attitudes (as they perceive them)
with a mind to the next election.
(The authors report "influence coefficients" of 88%.); Kornberg, Perception and Constitu-
ency Influence on Legislative Behavior, 19 WVasr. POL Q. 285, 291 (1966):
[S]ubstantial constituency control over legislative leaders has by now come to be re-
garded as a factual truth as well as a normative principle.. . .The taking of the
Burkean-Trustee role style is apparently a luxury .... The relatively small num-
ber who actually took the role of Trustees suggests that empirical reality (the re-
quirement of being reelected) precludes the taking of this role regardless of the
status attached to it.
(Of their sample, 15% said that they acted according to the Burkean role, 49% said that
they followed the delegate-representative model, and 36% adopted an intermediate posi-
tion); FROMAN, CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR CoNsrrrUENCIEs (1963); MNutts. & STon.s. RE'RE-
SENTATION IN THE AMERICAN CONGRESS (Prentice-Hall, in press); WAHMU, EULAU, BCIHANAN
& FERGUSON, supra note 29, at 281; Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress,
57 Am. PoL Sc. REV. 45, 45-46 (1963).
31. It might be argued that the more populous constituencies will tend to produce
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On the other hand, at least part of the time a legislator is supposed
to act as a delegate. Certainly American voters want and expect a
legislator who will execute their wishes on certain issues, and punish
those who deviate too far from the delegate model. While acting purely
in a representative capacity, a legislator will cast his vote as he thinks
the majority of his constituents would vote if they had the opportunity.
However infrequently a legislator may in fact try to act as a delegate
and however imprecise his estimate of his constituents' wishes, the
reapportionment decisions construed broadly outlaw systems which
deny voters an equal chance to have their wishes reflected in the votes
of their representative(s). No one can say a priori which legislators will
be best able to perform this function nor which will take their obliga-
tions most seriously. All that a legislative draftsman or judge can do
is to insure that the elective and representative system itself does not
tend to make it more likely that some citizens will be better able to
have their wishes reflected than others. Thus, in constructing a math-
ematical model, which must of necessity ignore many of the real prob-
lems of the system,32 one may hypothesize the representative to be no
more than a vehicle for reflecting as best he can the votes of his con-
stituents on certain issues. In such a model representative system, each
legislator would in effect poll his district on each issue and cast his
vote according to the majority vote. For the limited purpose of estab-
lishing the outer boundaries of a fair representative system, it seems
reasonable to assume this type of legislator as an oversimplified model.83
more able legislators simply because the number of qualified candidates will be hlgher.
However, this hardly seems to rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right de-
manding reapportionment to within 15%.
32. What little is known about how legislators' votes are influenced tends to cast
doubt on any theory which would have a constituent's ability to affect his representa-
tive's vote depend solely on the population of the district. Such a theory would ignore
party alliances, ethnic blocs, regional differences and interests, lobbying, influence
peddling, and other realities of political life. Yet, so far, the Supreme Court has looked
no further than population figures in deciding reapportionment cases. Moreover, the
justification offered for multi-member district systems also depends upon such a theory. If
influence and representation cannot with some reasonable degree of accuracy be ap-
proximated by such a theory, then the justification fails and multi-member district
systems should be abandoned. On the other hand, if any such numerical theory can give
even a reasonable approximation to political reality, it is submitted that the analysis
contained herein is at least mathematically consistent and therefore more likely to be
correct than the inverse ratio theory offered as justification for such systems.
33. The courts can go only so far in protecting the rights of citizens to equal repre-
sentation. Some factors which this model necessarily ignores are no doubt beyond the
competence of the courts to correct. Others are so imperfectly understood that theorizing
would be impractical.
This model does not assume that all legislators from a given multi-member district,
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With this as a model, it can be shown mathematically why in the
usual reapportionment case single-member districts must be of equal
population to guarantee equality of representation. Consider as an
example a legislative body representing three districts, A, B, and C,
each containing three voters (a1,a2,a3; b1,b2,b3; clc2,c3). Each district of
three voters is represented by a legislator who casts his vote in accord-
ance with the majority vote of his constituents. Each of the three repre-
sentatives has one vote in the legislative body.
Looking first at the legislative body, with three persons voting and
a choice of only yea or nay, there are eight different possible voting
combinations. 34 Each legislator will be "critical"-i.e., be able to alter
the result by changing his vote-in four of these cases.as The same
situation exists at the citizen-voter level. The citizens of each district
can cast their votes in eight different ways (voting combinations) and
each citizen-voter will be able to cast a critical vote in his district in
four of these.36 The true issue, however, is how well each citizen-voter
is actually represented in the legislature. In other words, considering
all of the combinations in which all nine of the votes could be cast, in
how many combinations will any individual voter be able to affect
the outcome through the medium of his representative's vote? The
answer is that he can cast a critical vote in his district in half of the
district's voting combinations and the resulting vote on behalf of the
district, as cast by its representative, is critical in half of the legislative
voting combinations. Combining these two figures, each voter can
cast a critical vote in one-fourth of the total voting combinations. Put
another way, if all of the other citizen-voters do not change their
original positions on any given issue, any given citizen-voter will be
able to change the legislative decision through the medium of his rep-
resentative's vote in one-fourth of the possible voting combinations by
changing his vote.37
because they are each supposed to be responsive to the same constituency, will as a result
tend to vote as a bloc. Representatives from the same district may of course differ in their
assessment of their constituents' ishes and may tend to vote according to the delegate
model with respect to different issues. If, however, there is some tendency for them to
vote as a bloc, the result will resemble to some extent a weighted voting situation with
additional inherent difficulties. See notes 10, 19-22 supra, and note 44 and accompanying
text infra.
34. See note 26 supra.
35. See table in note 26 supra.
36. A table similar to the one in note 26 could be constructed to show the voting
combinations of the citizen-voters in district A by replacing A, B, and C in the table
with a,, a2 , and a. (for district A). Thus, for example, a, would cast a deciding vote in
combinations 2, 3, 6, and 7.
37. It would also be possible to demonstrate this by constructing a table of the 512
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To show how this method may be applied to demonstrate the in-
equities in a classic case of malapportionment in which there are
single-member districts of substantially unequal population, consider
the case where the number of constituents in district A has grown to 5.
Representative A, like representatives B and C, can still cast a critical
vote in one-half of the legislative decisions. However, at the district
level, each resident of A can now cast a vote which will be critical with
respect to his representative's vote in twelve out of thirty-two possible
voting combinations. 5 Because of the increase in population, the votes
of residents of district A have less effect on their representative's vote
yet his vote is no more effective in the legislature. In terms of overall
effective representation, the citizen-voters in district A can cast a vote
which will be critical with respect to legislative decisions in only six
thirty-seconds of the voting combinations (one-half times twelve thirty-
seconds) while residents of the other two districts still may cast deci-
sive votes in one-fourth (eight thirty-seconds) of the combinations.
Thus, using this technique, it is possible to demonstrate mathematic-
ally exactly why and by how much a citizen is disadvantaged by being
a resident of an over-populated district in the usual single-member
district electoral system. It may likewise be used to determine whether
multi-member district systems provide equally effective representation
for all citizens.
Consider for purposes of illustration two districts in a state using
multi-member districts of unequal size. 9 District S has 10,000 people
and elects one legislator. District L has 40,000 voters and has four
legislators elected at large in the same house. The voting power of
all of the legislators in the body is the same because each can cast only
one vote. District L's four representatives, taken together, are four
possible voting combinations and examining each with respect to each citizen-voter.
The reader who is mathematically inclined may wish to compare this result with
that of a system of direct representation in which the nine citizens decide issues by a
simple majority vote. Any indivdual voter would then be critical only in a voting com-
bination in which the other 8 voters were equally divided. This could occur in 140 dif-
ferent ways out of a total of 512. Thus, in the idealized system of indirect representation
illustrated here, each citizen-voter has less chance of influencing the outcome than he
would have under a system of direct representation. However, under either arrangement,
the voting powers of all members are equal.
38. These figures may be obtained by constructing a table similar to that in note 26
supra. The thirty-two possible voting combinations can be examined and the ability of
each voter to affect the outcome noted. For example, using the same numbering system
as before, voter a1 casts a critical vote in combinations 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, 23, 26,
27 and 29. See also the calculations for district I in the same footnote.
39. This includes systems containing both single and multi-member districts as single-
member districts are degenerate forms of the more general multi-member district.
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times as powerful as District S's single legislator. Proponents will argue
that the voters are equally represented because each of District L's legis-
lators represents four times the number of people that district S's
legislator does: 4 divided by 40,000 equals 1 divided by 10,000; there
is one representative for every 10,000 people. Despite its simplistic
appeal, this argument is fallacious.
There is no justification here for simple division; the resulting
product has no meaning. Although at first glance it might seem to be
a logical operation, there is no mathematical theory to support it.
The issue is effective representation. In terms of the model and the
definition of voting power, the question is whether the relative ability,
however small, of the people in districts L and S to affect the outcome
of legislative decisions through the medium of their legislator's votes
is substantially equal. It has already been shown that in large districts
the ability to affect the outcome of an election between two candidates
varies as one divided by the square root of the population. The mathe-
matics and the result is the same here even though the model is dif-
ferent (because it is based on a broader interpretation of the Court's
opinions). The representative in the model votes according to the
majority vote of an imaginary poll of his constituents. The choice
once again is twofold: instead of choosing between candidates X and
Y, the people vote yea or nay on given propositions. 0 Therefore, in
mathematical terms the problem is identical and the ability of consti-
tuents to affect the outcome of legislative decisions through the me-
dium of their representative(s) also varies inversely as the square root
of the population. People in District L have more representation than
they are entitled to. By giving them more legislators than the diminu-
tion in their relative effectiveness required, the overall effect is
to give them twice as much voice in the legislature as residents of
S. Under either analysis (i.e., proceeding from either reading of the
Supreme Court's opinions), these inequities are inherent in the system.
Whether analyzed in terms of voting power or representation, systems
using different-sized multi-member districts contain hidden inequali-
ties.
Abstract mathematical analysis may suggest that the results are
equally abstract and that the conclusions are primarily of academic
interest. The following analysis of multi-member district systems in
40. In actual practice, people often choose various positions on any given issue.
However, these can always be broken down, as the legislator must eventually do, into
a series of yes or no answers to a number of spedfic legislative proposals.
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Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Texas, and Wyoming-each of which has
recently been involved in reapportionment litigation4 --demonstrates
the extent of the inequalities which may exist in many states today.
The simplified mathematical model in each case assumes that all dis-
tricts electing one legislator have the same population and that the
populations of the other districts are exact multiples. Because popu-
lations are not divided with mathematical precision, the actual ine-
qualities will vary somewhat from the figures presented in each table
but these variations will be small compared with the inequalities
shown in the tables. In each table minus signs (-) indicate under-
representation while plus signs (+) indicate over-representation (with
respect to each of the two averages).
ARKANSAS (House)
Number of Number of Effective Repre- Percent Deviation Percent Deviation
Legislators Districts sentation (as %) in Effective Repre- in Effective Repre-
Per District In State Compared With sentation With Re- sentation With Re-
Single-Member spect to Average spect to Average
District (Per District)* (Per Voter)* *
1 17 100% -- 30% -46%
2 15 141% - 1% -23%
3 6 173% +22% - 6%
4 3 200% + 41% + 9%
5 2 224% +58% + 22%
13 1 361% +154% +96%
* The average effective representation, computed on a per district basis, is 142% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 78% of the districts are below this
average in effective representation.
* The average effective representation, computed on a per voter basis, is 184% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 65% of the voters are below this
average in effective representation.
41. See Yancey v. Faubus, 251 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Ark. 1965), afJ'd sub. nora. Crawford
County Bar Ass'n v. Faubus, 883 U.S. 271 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 879 U.S. 43 (1965)
(Georgia, figures cited obtained from briefs); Holt v. Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724 (D.
Hawaii 1965), afJ'd sub. nora. Burns v. Richardson, 884 U.S. 78 (1966); Kilgarlin v. Martin,
252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo. 1965),
aff'd sub. nom. Harrison v. Schaefer, 883 U.S. 269 (1966).
Two different averages and deviations therefrom have been computed. The first is an
average per district, treating each district as the significant entity, and is obtained by
multiplying each district by its corresponding effective representation and dividing by the
total number of districts. The fourth column indicates deviations from this average. The
second is an average per citizen-voter, treating each citizen-voter as the significant entity,
and is obtained by multiplying the number of voters in each district (distributed as as-
sumed) by his corresponding effective representation and dividing by the total number of































* The average effective representation, computed on a per district basis, is 1167% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 77% of the districts are below this
average in effective representation.
** The average effective representation, computed on a per voter basis, is 143% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 70% of the voters are below this





























* The average effective representation, computed on a per district basis, is 173% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 25% of the districts are below this
average in effective representation.
** The average effective representation, computed on a per voter basis, is 185% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 36% of the voters are below this
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TEXAS (House)
Number of Number of Effective Repre- Percent Deviation Percent Deviation
Legislators Districts sentation (as %) in Effective Repre- in Effective Repre-
Per District In State Compared With sentation With Re- sentation With Re-
Single-Member spect to Average spect to Average
District (Per District)* (Per Voter) **
1 52 100% -22% -48%
2 9 141% + 9% -27%
3 4 173% +34% -10%
4 8 200% +55% + 4%
5 1 224% +74% + 17%
6 2 245% + 90% +28%
7 1 264% + 105% +37%
8 1 283% + 119% + 47%
10 1 316% + 145% + 65%
14 1 374% + 190% + 95%
* The average effective representation, computed on a per district basis, is 129% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 69% of the districts are below this
average in effective representation.
00 The average effective representation, computed on a per voter basis, is 192% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 55% of the voters are below this
average in effective representation.
WYOMING (Senate)
Number of Number of Effective Repre- Percent Deviation Percent Deviation
Legislators Districts sentation (as %) in Effective Repre- in Effective Repre-
Per District In State Compared With sentation With Re- sentation With Re-
Single-Member spect to Average spect to Average
District (Per District)0  (Per Voter)0 9
1 10 100% -21% -34%
2 4 141% + 11% - 7%
3 1 173% + 86% + 14%
4 1 200% + 57% +32%
5 1 224% +76% +47%
* The average effective representation, computed on a per district basis, is 127% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 59% of the districts arc below this
average in effective representation.
*0 The average effective representation, computed on a per voter basis, is 152% com-
pared with a single-member district. Approximately 60% of the voters are below this
average in effective representation.
V. THE RESULTS, AN ASSESSMENT AND OTHER APPLICATIONS
It is important to keep these results in their proper perspective. No
attempt has been made to evaluate all the advantages and disadvantages
of multi-member district systems. Furthermore there is no suggestion
that this article presents a realistic picture of their actual operations
which of course would involve factors which are not present in these
simple mathematical models. Finally this article is by no means an in-
dictment of all multi-member district systems.
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According to this theory there are no inherent inequalities where
all multi-member districts elect the same number of legislators. Where
the disparity in size is not too great the inherent inequalities in voting
power and representation may be tolerable in view of other socially
desirable ends which might not otherwise be achievable. Finally,
means may be found to counterbalance the inequalities which such
plans generate.42
Political realists will be happy to know that the basic method pre-
sented here may also be used as an analytic tool to evaluate the effect
of other factors affecting voting and representation. Thus parties may
be able to present courts with a more accurate analysis of reapportion-
ment plans (and even persuade them to enlarge their areas of con-
sideration), politicians may be able to make better informed judg-
ments, and political scientists may use this tool to dissect existing and
proposed systems (floterial districts, cumulative voting, limited voting,
proportional representation, etc.).
In the models it was assumed that all voters were equal and that
each was equally likely to vote one way as the other. This is by no
means the only possible assumption and the model may be varied to
simulate the effect of additional factors. In terms of voting power, one
might assume that certain blocs of voters would have a tendency to
vote for one party or the other, and then describe the results in
terms of statistical probabilities. Such studies are not unknown.43 Alter-
natively one could consider the effect of third party candidates by
allowing each model voter a three-way choice. Finally one might em-
pirically determine the voting patterns of various ethnic and/or so-
cioeconomic groups, replace the mass of voters whose voting habits
were presumed identical with those whose voting records are statisti-
42. It has been suggested that under this analysis one way of eliminating the in-
equalities would be to allocate legislators to multi-member districts in proportion to
the square root of their populations. This is hardly a workable solution. It would prob-
ably run afoul of the most commonly applied reapportionment standards and be tn-
acceptable to a large number of persons. The author sees no easy solution but feels
that the possibility of counterbalancing should not be dismissed.
43. It can be shown, for example, that if all of the districts for a given house are
single-member, if no more than two parties receive at least 90 percent of the popular
vote, and if the electoral strength of the two parties are equally distributed throughout
the state, the ratio of the seats won by the parties is approximately equal to the CUBE
of the state-wide popular vote each receives. Kendall & Stuart, The Law of Cubic Propor-
tion in Election Results, 1 BRnisH J. OF SoCIOLOGY 183 (1950). For a comparison of the
formula with actual results, see Bur=-, TnE ELECTORAL Sysrmi IN B=Arr 191-200 (1953);
LAKEAN & LAMBERT, VOTING IN DEMOCizAcms 48-49 (1955); NfcuraziE, FREE Ezxcnoxs
52 (1958).
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cally known, and calculate the voting power of the different blocs and
their individual members.
In terms of representation, one might attempt to set up a table of
relative influences upon a legislator (e.g., the relative persuasive power
of a newspaper editorial, a telegram, a hand-written letter, a form let-
ter, etc.) and from that calculate the relative abilities of various in-
terest groups to affect his vote through different allocations of their
resources. If it were possible to make some estimate of an individual
representative's "domination by the party" and his own ability in turn
to affect "party decisions" and thereby to affect the votes of other legis-
lators, a voter could estimate whether he could increase his chances
of affecting legislative decisions by voting for the "boss controlled"
candidate over the "fighting independent."
Naturally the method outlined here, being analytical and not em-
pirical, cannot provide any new facts about the representative process.
It can, however, provide new ways of looking at known information,
better ways of analyzing the information, and more accurate methods
of predicting political outcomes.
The analysis presented in this article has direct application to two
other important electoral systems: weighted voting (including frac-
tional voting) and the Electoral College. An earlier study by the author
revealed that weighted voting systems do not in fact allocate effective
voting power among legislators in proportion to the number of votes
each may cast (i.e. in proportion to their respective populations). The
present analysis, though directed primarily towards multi-member dis-
tricts, applies to any system of representation employing districts of
substantially unequal population. Whether voting power in the legis-
lature is distributed among several representatives elected at large
from each district or rests in only one legislator from each district who
casts multiple votes, the analysis and the results are the same; voters in
the more populous districts are overrepresented in proportion to the
square root of their populations. Thus weighted voting systems suffer
from two separate inherent defects; an inability to distribute voting
power among legislators in proportion to the number of votes each
can cast (which of course affects the effective representation of the
citizen-voters) and in addition a separate built-in bias in voting power
and effective representation in favor of the more populous districts.
These two analyses, moreover, are entirely consistent; in fact, the sec-
ond answers a question which was deliberately left open in the first. 44
44. See Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19
RuTGERS L. REv. 317, 319 n. 22 (1965).
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This technique of analysis may also be used to calculate the relative
abilities of voters in different states to affect the election of the Presi-
dent of the United States through the medium of presidential electors.
Because the electors vote only once and almost invariably reflect the
wishes of the majority of the voters they represent, the assumptions
implicit in the delegate model are clearly justified. It can be shown
that the relative ability of citizen-voters to affect the election of the
President under the state unit-vote (winner take all in each state) sys-
tem is proportional to the number of electors per state divided by the
square root of the state's population base. Thus, in the 1964 election
a voter in New York has over 2.3 times as much chance to affect the
election as a voter in Delaware. This is despite the so-called "small
state bias" which is said to result from allowing each state at least three
electors regardless of population (New York had approximately one
elector per 390,000 people; Delaware had approximately one elector
per 149,000 people). Leave was recently sought by Delaware to file an
original suit in the Supreme Court, based in part upon the author's
analysis, to invalidate the unit-vote rule while leaving the Electoral
College intact. Leave was not granted, apparently for reasons of pro-
cedure.45 Moreover, it is by no means certain that action short of a
constitutional amendment could equalize the effective voting power of
citizens of all of the states and the District of Columbia in the presi-
dential election.
VI. THE SuPIamE COURT AND MULTI-MEMBER DisTcrs
The Supreme Court has considered several reapportionment cases
involving multi-member districts and they are occasionally cited to
show the Court's unqualified endorsement of such systems. This is
far from correct. The Supreme Court has refused to strike down such
plans in the past either because the plans were improperly attacked
and/or because the record did not sustain the attackers' contentions.
In Fortson v. Dorsey,48 the petitioners contended that voters in the
most populous multi-member electoral district (Fulton County) were
discriminated against because residents of any one of the seven resi-
dence areas in the district (which were used "merely as the basis of
45. See Brief for Plaintiff, State of Delaware v. State of Ncw York, No. 28 Original
(filed July 28, 1966); 35 US. "Ekm 3138 (1966). The results reported in the papers cited
in note 16 supra are not relevant here because they involve inequalities resulting from
the distribution of voting power from the point of view of the states as "players"
(members of a voting body) and not the effect upon the individual citizen-voters.
46. 379 US. 433 (1965).
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residence for candidates, not for voting or representation") 47 had to
join with residents of the other residence areas in electing senators
under the system of countywide elections at large. The court below
granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment on the bare record
but the Supreme Court reversed because "it is not accurate to treat
a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only
that district within the county wherein he resides." 48 As to petitioners'
contention that the plans minimized the strength of political minori-
ties in the populous areas, the Court held that the record was insuf-
ficient to afford a basis for decision. 40
The Court expressly limited its ruling to a reversal of a grant of
summary judgment:
We treat the question as presented in that context, and our
opinion is not to be understood to say that in all instances or
under all circumstances such a system as Georgia has will comport
with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause.60
Strictly speaking, in reversing a grant of a motion for summary judg-
ment, the Court held only that these plaintiffs were not entitled to
the relief on the meager record before it. Even a broader reading would
establish only that voters of the more populous counties do not suffer
a disadvantage in representation-a result consistent with the analysis
presented herein.
In Burns v. Richardson,5' the lower court struck down a plan uti-
lizing multi-member districts because, among other things, they felt
that residents of the least populous districts had a built in advantage
in representation. The Supreme Court vacated, holding that the record
did not support this conclusion:
We conclude ... that H.B. No. 987 . . .has not been shown to
fall short of federal standards. . . . [T]he demonstration that a
particular multi-member scheme effects an invidious result must
appear from the evidence in the record .... That demonstration
was not made here.52
47. Id. at 438.
48. Ibid.
49. "But appellees never seriously pressed this point below and offered no proof to
support it, the District Court did not consider or rule on its merits, and In oral argu.
ment here counsel for appellees stressed that they do not rely on this argument, The
record thus does not contain any substantiation of the bold assertion In appellees' brief.
Since, under these circumstances, the issue has 'not been formulated to bring It Into
focus, and the evidence has not been offered or appraised to decide it, our holding has
no bearing on that wholly separate question.'" Id. at 439.
50. Id. at 438-39.
51. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
52. Id. at 86, 88.
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Once again they indicated their willingness to reconsider the question
where a proper demonstration of the alleged inequalities is made:
We direct the District Court... to adopt the plan. . until ...
constitutional deficiencies in the interim plan are shown ...
There may, for example, be merit in the argument that by en-
couraging block voting multi-member districts diminish the op-
portunity of a minority party to win seats. But such effects must
be demonstrated by evidence.53
The Supreme Court has also affirmed without opinion at least four
other cases involving multi-member districts."4 However, in none were
arguments similar to those presented in this article made to the courts
and therefore they cannot be considered precedent to the contrary.
In effect the Supreme Court is still waiting to be shown. It is hoped
that this article may help to shed some light on this largely unexplored
field.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made "one man, one vote" the law of the
land and has held that both houses of state legislatures must meet the
new standard. In issuing the edict, it has not indicated clearly whether
equal voting power for all citizens was the right being protected or
whether it was only a means to the more important end of equal
representation. Finally, it has refused to look beyond population
statistics in finding wrongs and fashioning remedies. Proponents of
multi-member district systems have argued that the plans pass muster
under these standards and have attempted to justify them in terms of
the simplistic mathematics which has so far characterized reapportion-
ment opinions. This article has analyzed the systems in these terms
and under these limitations and has found them wanting.
Under predefined conditions, voting power is susceptible of precise
mathematical analysis. To the extent that the theoretical model ap-
proximates the Court's simplified picture of the election of legis-
lators-i.e., where the Court considers only the relative number of
voters and the rules of the elective system-it can be shown that legis-
lative systems employing districts electing different numbers of repre-
sentatives inequitably allocate greater voting power to voters in the
most populous districts. This discrimination, which is inherent in all
such systems, is proportional to the square root of the district popula-
tion and may easily reach the magnitude of a constitutional deprivation.
53. Id. at 86, 88 n.14.
54. Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1966) (per curiam); Thornton v. Davis, 382 US. 42
(1966) (per curiam); Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 US. 269 (1966) (per curiam); Crawford
County Bar Assn v. Faubus, 583 U.S. 271 (1966) (per curiam).
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The Court for the most part has restricted its considerations of
equal representation to the population and the number of legislators
from each district and has granted relief only where the representa-
tive system itself discriminated against various constituencies. An
analysis of representation in these limited terms has been presented
which is consistent with certain fundamental beliefs about the func-
tions of a legislative system. As a test of the theory and as an example,
it can be used to describe in quantitative terms the rationale of the
reapportionment decisions. Applied to systems of unequal size multi-
member districts, the analysis shows that such systems inevitably create
inequities in representation proportional to the square root of the
district population. The inequalities are thus of the same form and
magnitude as those revealed in the distribution of voting power.
No attempt has been made to present in this article an all-inclusive
analysis of voting power or effective representation. The models have
deliberately been limited to the factors which the courts have so far
considered relevant. If they continue to limit their scrutiny to these
factors, this analysis should enable them to more carefully consider
and evaluate the effects of such systems. If they expand their considera-
tions in the quest for equal representation to other factors which are
known to affect voting power and effective representation, perhaps
this analysis can serve as a starting point from which a more inclusive
model can be developed. Whatever else it does, this article should
shift the burden of proof back to the proponents of such systems.
Without some further and more persuasive explanation of how such
systems are supposed to provide equal voting power and effective
representation to all of a state's citizens, the courts should strike them
down as an inconclusive experiment with the constitutional rights of
citizens in cases where the inequalities outweigh any legitimate social
interests which might be served.55
55. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Jack A. Blum, Senate Subcom-
mittee on Anti-trust and Monopoly, Prof. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., George Washington
University Law School, Martin A. Jacobs, Department of Mathematics, Fairleigh Dickinson
University, Prof. Irwin Mann, Department of Mathematics, New York University, Lloyd
S. Shapley of RAND Corp., and Donald Wardle c/o Columbia Law School for their help-
ful comments and suggestions.
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